|
Abstract
In 2001, the Malaysian Securities Commission decided
to suspend poorly performing companies from trading
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and enacted
a regulation referred to as Practice Note 4 (PN4). According
to this regulation, if a company's shareholder equity
is negative, if it receives a going concern qualification,
or if a receiver is appointed, then KLSE could classify
it as a PN4 company. Using a sample of 21 PN4 and 42
non-PN4 comparable companies over the period 2001-2004,
this paper investigates the governance mechanisms, disclosures
and financing strategies that identify the PN4 companies
and studies the economic consequences of this regulation.
The study finds that outsiders in PN4 companies incurred
agency costs due to extremely high insider ownership
and poor internal governance. The Malaysian institutional
environment is used to discuss the reasons why the PN4
regulation fails to lower managerial agency costs.
top
|